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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001746

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [CG](#)

SUBJECT: RCD/G WANTS MORE FROM TRANSITION

REF: KINSHASA 1657

Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D

1. (C) Summary. In exchange for returning to Kinshasa and the transitional government on September 1, VP Ruberwa asked the government and international community to address a laundry list of RCD/G concerns about the transition. The demands, which ranged from disbanding parallel military structures and firing a military commander to sorting out parastatal appointments and ending hate media, did not resonate with many Congolese who have vastly different concerns with the present state of the transition. End Summary.

It Isn't Fair...

2. (C) Ruberwa met with the Ambassador and polcouns on September 1 and with the Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and former Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, who visited the DRC in her capacity as a member of the Blair Commission for Africa, on September 2. Ruberwa claimed the RCD/G has not received equal treatment in the transition, discussed general insecurity in the east, and raised what he called the 'genocide' in Gatumba. Ruberwa gave the Ambassador a summary of political, military, and economic demands, including an end to parallel structures within the transitional government, dismissal of certain military commanders, convening the Supreme Military Council, removal of recently deployed FARDC troops from eastern DRC and a share of posts in the parastatals and other government entities. The RCD/G also called on the transitional government to end hate media and develop a plan to bring refugees back to S. Kivu. See para 5 for complete list.

...or Working

3. (C) In addition to his specific demands, Ruberwa said the transition process is not working, and he does not see how elections can take place in this type of insecure environment. President Kabila makes most important decisions within the Presidency and the 'Maison Militaire' (a parallel military advisory structure controlled by the President and key hardliners, including Samba Kaputo) without any reference to Ruberwa. For example, Ruberwa said he was not informed that VP Bemba and Kabila planned to send large numbers of troops to the east, which further marginalized his role as VP of Politics and Security. (Comment: Bemba sent large numbers of troops from Gbadolite and reportedly received several million dollars for ferrying troops in his planes. End comment.) Ruberwa said that S. Kivu military commander BG Mabe had deliberately integrated anti-Banyamulenge forces into the military, which has contributed to a generally anti-Banyamulenge, anti-RCD, and anti-Ruberwa policy on the part of the former government.

Mbeki's Mediation

4. (C) Ruberwa said he was very happy with South African President Thabo Mbeki's mediation efforts during his August 30-31 visit to Kinshasa. (Note: On September 10, he told a CIAT delegation the same thing. See septel. End note.) Ruberwa said Mbeki wanted to see the Global Accord respected, understood there were stresses in the transition, and tried hard to mediate specifically between Kabila and Ruberwa. (Comment: In fact, one presidential advisor told polcouns that Mbeki's high-profile involvement angered President Kabila, and led to Kabila's refusal to meet jointly with Ruberwa and Mbeki during the latter's visit, forcing the South African President into a series of time-consuming 'shuttle diplomacy' meetings--a method later confirmed by the South African Ambassador in a CIAT briefing. End comment.)

What does the RCD/G want?

5. (U) The RCD/G's list of demands, as presented in Ruberwa's August 31 letter to Mbeki, follows:

--End parallel structures within the transitional government and encourage the normal functioning of Institutions set up by the All Global and Inclusive Accord

--Set up a joint mechanism (CIAT) Components) to evaluate the transition every three months and include the mediator and the co-mediators in the follow-up process for the transition

--Recognize the role of the Vice President in charge of the Political, Defense and Security Commission in the daily management of military, security and diplomatic issues, as well as his authority over the army and security services

--Finish dividing up 'responsibilities' within the parastatals, financial enterprises, security services and the local provincial administration. Until divided, retain existing structures put in place by the various administrations

--Release individuals jailed for political opinions or membership in the RCD

Military Demands

--Dismiss the 10th Military Region Commander (BG Mbuja Mabe) and certain of his officers who were 'actual or intellectual' authors of the Gatumba genocide, and killings and massacres in Bukavu and Kalehe (Comment. There is no proof to support these allegations. End comment.)

--Convene the Defense Supreme Council and establish a calendar of meetings (done)

--Immediately set up a mechanism to identify and neutralize ex-FAR, Interahamwe and FNL militia who are hiding in the FARDC

--Reinstate all former ANC commanders and put them back in control of their respective units until the army integration process is complete

--Stop all new deployments of troops to eastern DRC until the regular integration process is complete

--Regroup recently deployed troops to eastern DRC outside North and South Kivu until integration can take place and negative forces (ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and FNL) can be removed from the FARDC

--Reinstate the 8th Military Region Commander's (BG Obedi) authority over all of North Kivu

--Immediately release arrested former ANC military officers

Economic/Financial Demands

--Allow Goma-based companies and enterprises which were authorized by the former RCD administration to operate throughout the country

--Audit public property management without obstructions from state agencies

--Submit large expenditures of all government agencies, including the Presidency, to public bid procedures and make joint decisions on government expenditures

Other Concerns

--Set a time-line for the return of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda, and provide for the refugees' security

--End hate media, as well as discriminatory, racist, ethnic and xenophobic speeches

--Ensure non-discriminatory access to official media for all political parties

Comment

16. (C) Ruberwa's demands are focused on RCD/G and Banyamulenge concerns and are out-of-touch with political realities in much of eastern DRC and Kinshasa. Most Congolese hope to get to elections as quickly as possible and want to see more of the central government--not less. Ruberwa undoubtedly feels buffeted by strong forces he cannot control. He is mistrusted by most of the political leaders in Kinshasa, he is under attack from Bizima Karaha and other hard-liners within his own party, and not unrelated--he harbors strong fears for his personal security at all times. His inability to act as a national vice president by seeing past his political party and ethnic identity, however, severely limits his effectiveness as a party and national leader. Moreover, the problem is made worse by his tendency to make unhelpful, impassioned statements when provoked by a perceived injury to one of his constituencies. (Note: Unless provoked he has an intensely legal, pedantic style of speaking. End note.) We will encourage Ruberwa to think and

act to present the RCD/G as a national political party and not as an ethnic movement, to further his own interests as well as those of his core constituency and the country generally. Most importantly, we will stress the importance of avoiding any military actions that will only work to the further detriment of Tutsis and other groups in the east, and to his own party. He and other RCD/G leaders, however, must be aware of their very limited popular support and therefore limited options for a political future in a post-election DRC.

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